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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. If the court makes a determination that the 
husband's property was not acquired during the course of the 
marriage through the j o in t e f for t s of the pa r t i e s and, therefore , 
the husband is en t i t l ed to an award of that property as his "sole 
and separate" property, can the t r i a l court properly award the 
ex-wife the proceeds from the sale of that sole and separate pro-
perty in the form of alimony or should i t be excluded from con-
s idera t ion when deciding the wife fs enti t lement to alimony. 
2. Upon the divorce of the pa r t i e s to a short-term 
marriage, may the husband be required to pay alimony to the wife 
from property he acquired by inheri tance to which the wife 
contributed nothing e i ther through her individual ef for ts or 
through the pa r t i e s 1 jo in t e f for t s in the marriage. 
3. Has the t r i a l court committed error in awarding the 
ex-wife alimony based solely upon the husband's a b i l i t y to pay and 
ignoring the equal needs and income earning a b i l i t i e s of the p a r t i e s . 
4. Did the t r i a l court abuse i t s d i sc re t ion in awarding 
$800 a month in permanent alimony to the wife when the wife had 
f inancial asse ts and an earning a b i l i t y suf f ic ien t to maintain 
herself at the standard of l iving the pa r t i e s enjoyed throughout 
most of the marriage and where the marriage was c h i l d l e s s , of 
1 
r e l a t i v e l y short duration and entered l a t e in l i f e af ter previous 
marriages, 
5, Is a woman e n t i t l e d to a l i fe t ime annuity from her 
ex-husband simply because he has the f inancial a b i l i t y to pay i t . 
6. I s t h e Utah Alimony S t a t u t e b e i n g u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 
a p p l i e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t s due t o a l a c k of s t a n d a r d s . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 1 , 1972 , John B. Sampinos and Donna R. 
C h r i s t e n s e n were m a r r i e d . (R. 50) John was t h e n aged 44; Donna 
was 4 1 . (R. 50) I t was a second m a r r i a g e fo r John and a t h i r d 
m a r r i a g e fo r Donna. (R. 50; S t i p u l a t i o n of M a t e r i a l F a c t s , p . 3 
II 1 3 ; T r . 4-6 & 1 0 9 . ) T h e i r s h o r t - t e r m m a r r i a g e of 11 y e a r s was 
p u n c t u a t e d by fou r s e p a r a t i o n s l a s t i n g a t o t a l of o v e r four 
y e a r s . (R. 43 & 50) No c h i l d r e n were born of t h e m a r r i a g e . (R. 
50) Both John and Donna had c h i l d r e n from t h e i r p r e v i o u s 
m a r r i a g e s , a l l of whom were grown a t t h e t ime of d i v o r c e (R. 50) 
The p a r t i e s s e p a r a t e d fo r t h e l a s t t ime in S e p t e m b e r , 1983 . (R. 
3 7 , 44 , 122) A f t e r a t r i a l in May 1984 , a Decree of Divorce was 
e n t e r e d on November 1 , 1984. (R. 55) 
At t h e t i m e of t h e m a r r i a g e , John owned a b u s i n e s s 
c a l l e d t h e "Savoy C l u b " , an unimproved b u i l d i n g l o t in P r i c e , 
U t a h , and a j o i n t i n t e r e s t w i th a c o u s i n in some farm equipment 
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which was used to ope ra t e h i s p a r e n t s 1 farm. (R. 51) Soon a f t e r 
the m a r r i a g e , in October 1973, h i s pa r en t s gave the farm, which 
had been in the Sampinos family s ince the Great Depress ion, to 
John and each of h i s four s i s t e r s equa l l y (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law p . 4 1| 15 (unpaginated page between R. 51 & 
52, h e r e i n a f t e r MR. 51aH)) 
At the time of the mar r i age , Donna owned a house known 
as "Mi l le r Creek" (R. 51a) and some household f u r n i t u r e and 
a p p l i a n c e s . (Defendant ' s Exhibi t No. 11; Tr . 27 & 110) Before 
the m a r r i a g e , Donna had received $310 a month in Socia l Secur i ty 
b e n e f i t s from her former deceased husband. (Tr . 109) These 
payments te rminated upon her marr iage to John and would o therwise 
have terminated only 11 months l a t e r , upon her s o n ' s 16th b i r t h -
day. (R. 67) 42 USC 5402(g)(1) and ( s ) ( l ) . 
During the ma jo r i ty of the m a r r i a g e , n e i t h e r of the par-
t i e s enjoyed a p a r t i c u l a r l y l a v i s h l i f e s t y l e . (R. 43 & 51) John 
opera ted the Savoy Club, earning about $500 a month u n t i l 1977 
when he subleased the c l u b . (R. 51; Tr . 26-27) At the time of 
t r i a l , J o h n ' s ne t income from the club was about $3,000 annua l ly . 
(R. 43) From 1977 to 1982, when he was l a i d off work, John 
worked as a c a r p e n t e r earning from $1,800 to $2,000 a month. (R. 
45 & 52) Throughout the marr iage and a t the time of t r i a l , John 
a l s o worked on the Sampinos family farm, earn ing about $2,000 
annua l ly most ly from the s a l e of a l f a l f a , (R. 27, 42) 
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Donna was a l s o employed p r i o r to and dur ing a subs tan-
t i a l po r t ion of the m a r r i a g e . She worked for s ix months in 1968-69 
as a p a r t - t i m e s e c r e t a r y for a school d i s t r i c t , for 1-1/2 yea r s 
in 1969-71 as a bank t e l l e r , for s ix months in 1973 and again in 
1974 as a bookkeeper , and for s ix months in 1975 and again in 
1976 as a p a y r o l l c l e r k . (R. 50-51; Tr . 120-122; S t i p u l a t i o n of 
Mate r i a l Facts pp . 6-7; T r . 8) Donna's e a r n i n g s dur ing these 
p e r i o d s of employment ranged from $500 to $1,000 a month. ( I d . ) 
In 1979, Donna sold Mi l le r Creek, n e t t i n g over $47,000, 
a l l of which she had d i s s i p a t e d p r i m a r i l y for her own b e n e f i t a t 
the time of t r i a l . (R. 51a) In 1977, Donna rece ived g i f t s and 
an i n h e r i t a n c e from her f a the r amounting to over $10,000, a l l of 
which she had d i s s i p a t e d for her so le b e n e f i t a t the time of 
t r i a l . (R. 51a; T r . 136) 
In 1980, the Sampinos family farm suddenly increased 
in value upon the d i s cove ry of coal d e p o s i t s under the sur face 
(R. 43-44, 51a) In October 1980, John and h i s four s i s t e r s sold 
the farm, s u b j e c t to a leaseback of the graz ing and farming 
r i g h t s , to P a c i f i c Gas and E l e c t r i c for $2 ,300 ,000 . (R. 51a; 
P l a i n t i f f ' s Exh ib i t s No. 3 & 4) Of a down payment of $400,000, 
John rece ived $69,000. ( P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibi t No. 4; T r . 48) J o h n ' s 
t o t a l share of the s a l e s p r i c e wi l l be $460,000 before t axes 
which a re very s u b s t a n t i a l . The ba lance was payable in 30 semi-
annual i n s t a l l m e n t s . J o h n ' s one f i f t h share of the c o n t r a c t 
payments i s about $25,000 on each i n s t a l l m e n t . ( P l a i n t i f f ' s 
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Exhib i t No. 3; T r . 41) The f i n a l payment i s to be received in 
J u l y 1996, or about 11 y e a r s from the da te of t r i a l . 
( P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibi t # 3) After t h a t time John wi l l r ece ive no 
more income from h i s i n h e r i t a n c e . When J o h n ' s income stops in 
1986 John wi l l be 68 y e a r s o l d . 
Around J u l y 1980, soon a f t e r John had received h is share 
of the downpayment for the s a l e of the Sampinos family farmf he 
and Donna r econc i l ed for the l a s t t ime . (Defendant ' s Exhibi t 13; 
T r . 34, 57) Only then did the p a r t i e s enjoy any kind of a l a v i s h 
l i f e s t y l e , which cont inued u n t i l t h e i r f i na l s epa ra t i on in 1983. 
(R. 44) In 1981, the p a r t i e s purchased a house and an adjo in ing 
l o t known as " Crestv iew" s o l e l y from the proceeds of the farm 
s a l e . Donna c o n t r i b u t e d nothing to the purchase p r i c e of the 
house . (R. 51a-52) 
The t r i a l c o u r t found t h a t the "coal c o n t r a c t from the 
[ s a l e of the Sampinos family farm] and the proceeds therefrom are 
not a s s e t s acquired during the course of the marr iage through the 
j o i n t e f f o r t s of the p a r t i e s but were rece ived as a g i f t or 
i n h e r i t a n c e from [John ' s ] pa ren t s and [ a r e ] , t h e r e f o r e , awarded 
to defendant as h i s s o l e and sepa ra te p r o p e r t y . " (R. 53) The 
c o u r t f u r the r awarded John , as p rope r ty which was e i t h e r owned by 
him before the mar r iage or acquired from proceeds of such p ro -
p e r t y , h i s i n t e r e s t in the Savoy Club, the farm equipment, and 
the unimproved l o t in P r i c e , Utah. (R. 53) The cou r t found t h a t 
the Crestv iew house and adjacent l o t was purchased " s o l e l y out of 
the proceeds of the ' c o a l r i g h t s ' s a l e and using no money from 
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P l a i n t i f f " (R. 51a) and awarded them to J o h n , s u b j e c t t o a 
$20 ,000 mor tgage in f avor of Donna. (R. 53) 
The c o u r t awarded Donna "a p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t " of 
$25 ,000 " t o compensa te he r for he r s h a r e of t h e C r e s t v i e w h o u s e , 
Savoy a s s e t s , and any c o n t r i b u t i o n s she made on any of t h e o t h e r 
a s s e t s and to t he m a r r i a g e of t h e p a r t i e s . " (R. 44 , 53) $5 ,000 
of t h e s e t t l e m e n t was made p a y a b l e w i t h i n 60 days o f t h e d a t e of 
t h e Decree and the r e m a i n d e r was s e c u r e d by t h e m o r t g a g e on t h e 
C r e s t v i e w house and made p a y a b l e in s e m i - a n n u a l i n s t a l l m e n t s f o r 
20 y e a r s a t 12% pe r annum. (R. 53) The c o u r t f u r t h e r awarded to 
Donna any r e m a i n d e r of h e r i n h e r i t a n c e (R. 54) and t h e p a r t i e s ' 
h o u s e h o l d f u r n i t u r e and a p p l i a n c e s (R. 5 4 ) . 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e c o u r t found t h a t " [ b ] o t h p l a i n t i f f 
and d e f e n d a n t a r e h e a l t h y , a b l e - b o d i e d and a b l e t o work ." (R. 
52) Both John and Donna had comple ted two y e a r s o f c o l l e g e . ( T r . 
8 4 , 123) N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e c o u r t awarded a l imony of $800 p e r 
month t o Donna, " [ b i a s e d upon t h e n e e d s of t h e p l a i n t i f f and the 
a b i l i t y of t h e d e f e n d a n t t o pay t h o s e n e e d s from h i s e a r n i n g s , " 
and " p l a i n t i f f ' s l o s s of S o c i a l S e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s . " (R. 53) 
T h i s a p p e a l i s s o l e l y from the a l i m o n y p r o v i s i o n of t h e 
D e c r e e . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
C o n s i s t e n c y , l o g i c and f a i r n e s s r e q u i r e t h a t John 
Sampinos ' i n h e r i t a n c e n o t be d i s t r i b u t e d under t h e g u i s e of 
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alimony to his ex-wife. John's inheri tance was properly awarded 
to him as "sole and separate property" because i t was not the 
product of the j o in t e f for t s of the p a r t i e s . But for John's 
inher i t ance , the pa r t i e s were s imi lar ly s i t u a t e d , being nearly 
equal in age, in hea l th , in education and in employabil i t y . 
The alimony award to Donna was based on outdated notions 
and unconst i tut ional presumptions regarding the respect ive ro les 
of men and women in our socie ty , e . g . , tha t the husband is the 
family breadwinner and supports the wife and that the wife does 
not work outside the home and depends on the husband for support. 
Not only have these notions changed over time, but due process 
and equal protection mandate that they be abolished in applying 
the law and that men and women be considered on a case by case 
bas is in determining alimony awards. The p a r t i e s ' marriage in 
the present case was an unconventional one in which neither the 
husband nor the wife f i t the s tereotypical r o l e . Based on these 
circumstances, the award of alimony was e r r o r . 
Based on the equi table ru le that property acquired by a 
spouse through inheri tance and not through the p a r t i e s ' jo in t 
e f fo r t s in the marriage should, upon divorce, be awarded to that 
spouse as sole and separate property, the t r i a l court properly 
awarded John Sampinos the income from the sale of the Sampinos 
family farm. At the same time, however, the t r i a l court included 
that income in considering John 's a b i l i t y to provide support to 
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Donna Sampinos and in awarding her $800 a month in permanent a l i -
mony. In awarding alimony based on John's inher i t ance , the t r i a l 
court in ef fect awarded Donna a share of property to which she 
had contributed nothing through e i the r individual or j o in t 
e f f o r t . As suchf the $800 monthly award unjustly deprived John 
of about 30% of his inher i tance before t axes , and const i tuted a 
windfall to Donna and should be reversed. 
In add i t ion , the t r i a l court erred in fa i l ing to analyze 
the f inancial condit ions and needs of Donna Sampinos and her abi-
l i t y to produce a su f f i c ien t income for herse l f . Except for a 
b r ie f time at the end of t he i r short and in te rmi t ten t l i f e 
toge ther , the p a r t i e s ' standard of l iving during the marriage was 
modest. Donna's f inancial resources are more than suf f ic ien t to 
maintain her at the standard of l iving enjoyed by the pa r t i e s 
throughout most of t he i r marriage and no alimony should have been 
awarded . 
F ina l ly , under the circumstances of t h i s marriage, the 
award of permanent alimony was improper. This was a c h i l d l e s s , 
short- term marriage, punctuated by long separa t ions . Both par-
t i e s entered the marriage l a t e in l i f e and after previous 
marr iages. Assuming, arguendo, tha t some need for alimony was 
es tabl ished by the evidence, the award should have been limited 
to a reasonable, temporary period and th i s Court should modify 
the decree accordingly. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING THE HUSBAND 
HIS INHERITANCE AS HIS "SOLE AND SEPARATE 
PROPERTY" ON THE ONE HAND AND THEN TURNING RIGHT 
AROUND AND TAKING IT AWAY FROM HIM IN THE FORM 
OF AN ALIMONY AWARD TO HIS EX-WIFE ON THE OTHER 
1 . The T r i a l C o u r t Was C o r r e c t i n A w a r d i n g t h e S a m p i n o s 
F a m i l y Farm t o J o h n As H i s S o l e and S e p a r a t e P r o p e r t y * 
At t r i a l i t was e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t d u r i n g t h e d e p r e s s i o n 
o f t h e 1 9 3 0 ' s , J o h n S a m p i n o s ' f a t h e r , a G r e e k i m m i g r a n t , a c q u i r e d 
100 a c r e s o f h i l l s i d e s h e e p g r a z i n g g r o u n d in t h e m o u n t a i n s n e a r 
P r i c e , U t a h . (R . 4) At t r i a l i t was a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t 
J o h n S a m p i n o s 1 f a t h e r worked t h e l a n d g r o w i n g a l f a l f a and r a i s i n g 
s h e e p u n t i l he f i n a l l y e a r n e d e n o u g h money t o b r i n g h i s w i f e from 
G r e e c e t o A m e r i c a . 
J o h n S a m p i n o s , h i s f a t h e r , m o t h e r and f o u r s i s t e r s 
w o r k e d t h e f a m i l y f a rm a l l o f t h e i r l i v e s and when J o h n ' s f a t h e r 
r e a c h e d o l d a g e and i n f i r m i t y , he made a g i f t o f t h e farm t o h i s 
f i v e c h i l d r e n , s h a r e and s h a r e a l i k e (R. 4 ; P l a i n t i f f ' s E x h i b i t 1) 
Upon r e c e i v i n g t h e g i f t o f t h e fa rm from t h e i r f a t h e r , 
t h e f i v e S a m p i n o s c h i l d r e n e n t e r e d i n t o an a g r e e m e n t t h a t t h e 
m o n e t a r y p r o c e e d s d e r i v e d from t h e l a n d would b e u s e d t o s u p p o r t 
t h e i r p a r e n t s s o l o n g a s t h e y w e r e a l i v e ( P l a i n t i f f ' s E x h i b i t 2) 
Fo r t h e s e r e a s o n s t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o r r e c t l y f o u n d t h a t t h e 
S a m p i n o s F a m i l y Farm was n o t " a p r o d u c t o f t h e j o i n t e f f o r t s o f 
t h e p a r t i e s " and t h e r e f o r e n o t a m a r i t a l a s s e t s u b j e c t t o 
e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n by t h e c o u r t . (R . 53) The 
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c o u r t then awarded J o h n ' s o n e - f i f t h share of h i s f a m i l y ' s farm to 
him as h i s " s o l e and sepa ra t e p r o p e r t y . — ' 
2. The T r i a l Court Then Committed Error by Awarding 
30% of J o h n ' s Pretax I n h e r i t a n c e to His Ex-Wife in the Form of 
Al imony. 
The very f i r s t ques t ion which the a p p e l l a n t seeks the 
c o u r t to address i s : What does i t mean when the c o u r t d e c l a r e s a 
p e r s o n ' s p r o p e r t y to be h i s or her so le and s e p a r a t e proper ty? 
At t r i a l i t was e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t n e i t h e r John nor Donna was 
employed a t the time (Tr . 46 & 116-17; R. 52); however, i t was 
a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t both John and Donna were e q u a l l y employable 
in t h a t they were both approximate ly the same age f both of equal 
educa t ion (two years c o l l e g e ) , and both ab l e bodied and in good 
h e a l t h . (R. 50, 52; T r . 84, 123) Both Donna and John had been 
p r e v i o u s l y employed. Donna was s k i l l e d in bookkeeping and 
account ing (R. 50-51; T r . 120-122, S t i p u l a t i o n of Mater ia l F a c t s , 
p p . 6-7; T r . 8) and John had been a c a r p e n t e r and worked the 
family farm (Tr . 82) Although n e i t h e r p a r t y had a job at the 
t ime of the t r i a l , John admit ted he could ge t a job and Donna 
c a n d i d l y admit ted t h a t a l though she was employable , she simply 
—' The c o u r t ' s award of the p rope r ty to John was c o r r e c t as the 
s tandard was well e s t a b l i s h e d in Pres ton v . P r e s t o n , 646 P. 2d 705 
(Utah 1982) where the Utah Court h e l d : 
In o rde r for p rope r ty to be cons idered as 
p a r t of the m a r i t a l e s t a t e i t must be 
"acqui red through the j o i n t e f f o r t s of 
the p a r t i e s during the term of the m a r r i a g e . " 
Emphasis added. 
Id . a t 706. 
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"never liked working", (Tr. 118) Notwithstanding that John's 
only source of income at time of t r i a l was the proceeds from the 
2/ sa le of h is one-f if th share of the family farm,—' the court 
awarded Donna a $25,000 cash award payable over 20 years at 12% 
in te res t plus $800 per month alimony, or $9,600 per year, which 
works out to approximately 30% of John's to t a l remaining (pretax) 
inheri tance from his family farm. 
Obviously, since the court determined the family farm to 
be John's "sole and separate property," the court should not turn 
around and award John 's property to Donna under the guise of a l i -
mony. If the Family Farm was not the "product of the j o in t 
e f fo r t s of the par t ies" and therefore not to be considered as 
par t of the mari ta l es ta te for purposes of property d i s t r i b u t i o n , 
consistency and logic require that his sole and separate property 
not be taken away in the form of alimony. 
Simply s t a t e d : If John Sampinos' inheritance is not 
par t of the mari tal e s t a t e , then the income from the sale of the 
farm should not be considered in determining the amount of any 
alimony award. To award John/s inheri tance to him as his "sole 
and separate property," then take i t away in the form of alimony, 
i s not only incons i s ten t , i t i s unfair and upsets the symmetry 
and logic of the law. In other words, if the court has said th is 
property belongs to John and Donna i s not en t i t l ed to i t , then i t 
should be his to keep and Donna should not share in i t . 
— Plus about $2,000 from the sale of a l fa l fa which John grows 
on the family farm and a modest ren ta l income from the Savoy Club, 
a lso a Sampinos family g i f t . 
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3. Under the Court 's Order, if John s t i l l owned the 
family farm his ex-wife would not be en t i t l ed to any portion of 
that property; accordingly, the proceeds from the sale of that 
land should also be exempt from her reach. 
The t r i a l court held because the Sampinos Family Farm 
was "not an asse t accumulated through the j o i n t e f fo r t s of the 
p a r t i e s during the term of the marriage" that John 's ex-wife had 
no r igh t to receive any port ion of tha t land in the divorce pro-
perty se t t lement . Presumably under the c o u r t ' s order if John and 
his s i s t e r s were to keep the land, ra i se the i r sheep and grow the i r 
a l f a l f a , Donna would not be en t i t l ed to share in any portion of 
tha t land; why then should Donna suddenly become en t i t l ed to a 
30% share of John's i n t e r e s t simply because the Sampinos children 
are growing too old to operate the farm and decided to se l l i t . 
If the law is to be respected, i t must be based upon 
l o g i c , and if i t i s to be l o g i c a l , i t must be cons i s t en t . The 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s order was i l l o g i c a l in holding the property to be 
unreachable by Donna if owned, but reachable by Donna if sold. 
4. The Trial Court Totally Ignored the Fact That Donna 
Received over $50,000 From the Sale of Her Own Home and Inheritance 
and Failed to Share Any of That With John. 
Although the record was c lear that Donna received over 
$50,000 from the sale of her home and an inher i tance from her 
f a the r , the court t o t a l l y ignored that fact in dividing up the 
proper ty . 
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I t i s a l m o s t i n c r e d i b l e how s u b t l y o b l i v i o u s t h e c o u r t s 
a r e t o t h e i r p r e d i s p o s i t i o n t o s e x u a l b i a s when i t comes t o 
d i v i d i n g up m a r i t a l e s t a t e s . O b v i o u s l y , t h e c o u r t e r r e d in n o t 
g i v i n g J o h n an o f f s e t a g a i n s t h i s home and i n h e r i t a n c e commen-
s u r a t e w i t h t h e a w a r d t o D o n n a ' s o f h e r own " s o l e and s e p a r a t e 
p r o p e r t y , " 
POINT I I 
THE ENTIRE CONCEPT OF ALIMONY MUST BE RE-EXAMINED AS IT 
HAS BECOME AN ARCHAIC, STEREOTYPICALLY SEX BIASED 
DOCTRINE WHICH DISCRIMINATES AGAINST MEN If 
1• Most s i m p l y p u t , t h e q u e s t i o n t h i s c a s e p r e s e n t s : 
I s a woman e n t i t l e d t o a l i f e t i m e a n n u i t y s i m p l y b e c a u s e s h e 
was m a r r i e d t o a man f o r a s h o r t t i m e j u s t b e c a u s e he h a p p e n s t o 
h a v e t h e money t o p a y i t . 
T h e r e i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y t h e r e was good 
r e a s o n f o r t h e e q u i t a b l e D o c t r i n e o f A l i m o n y . 
The h i s t o r i c a l i d e a l was t h a t men w e r e t h e b r e a d - w i n n e r s 
who wen t o u t , g o t an e d u c a t i o n , p u r s u e d a c a r e e r and e a r n e d t h e 
money t o s u p p o r t and m a i n t a i n t h e f a m i l y . H i s t o r i c a l l y t h e woman 
wou ld f o r e g o t h e b e n e f i t o f e d u c a t i o n and c a r e e r and a g r e e u n d e r 
t h e m a r r i a g e c o n t r a c t t o b e a r , n u r t u r e and r a i s e t h e c h i l d r e n , 
k e e p t h e home and p r o v i d e t h e f a m i l y w i t h a l l o f t h e s e r v i c e s 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y p r o v i d e d by t h e h o m e m a k e r . An o l d U t a h c a s e , 
— M i s s i s s i p p i U n i v e r s i t y f o r Women v . H o g a n , 458 U . S . 7 1 8 , 73 
L . E d . 2 d 1 0 9 0 , 102 S . C t . 3331 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . 
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Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P. 2d 252 (1943) describes 
the t r a d i t i o n a l reasons for alimony: 
The basis and reason for allowing alimony to 
the wife i s to repay her for the years spent 
in caring for the household and helping the 
husband in building up his property, and to 
enable her to l ive a f te r the husband's support 
is taken away from her? or in cer ta in cases to 
recompense her as far as mater ial recompense 
wil l do so for in jur ies or abuse to her person 
or impairment of health brought on by conduct 
or c rue l ty of the husband during cover ture . 
(Emphasis added) 
lei. a t 252. 
More r ecen t ly , in Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 
517 P.2d 1010 (Utah 1973), reversed 421 US 7, 95 S. Ct. 1373, 43 
L.Ed.2d 688 (1975), the Utah court sa id : 
I t may be that our ancestors for genera-
t ions before us have been misguided in the i r 
be l ie f tha t there are some fundamental dif-
ferences between the sexes. But i t i s 
remarkable how some of those old notions do 
continue to prevai l as to numerous in te res t ing 
d i f ferences . Included among them is the 
bel ief held by many tha t general ly i t i s the 
man's primary r e spons ib i l i t y to provide a home 
and i t s e s s e n t i a l s for the family; and that 
however many exceptions and whatever necessary 
and proper va r i a t ions therefrom may ex i s t in 
di f fer ing circumstances, i t i s a sa lu ta ry 
thing for him to get a good education and/or 
t ra in ing before he undertakes those respon-
s i b i l i t i e s . 
Perhaps more important than t h i s , there i s 
another widely accepted idea: that g i r l s tend 
general ly to mature physica l ly , emotionally 
and mentally before boys, and that they 
general ly tend to marry e a r l i e r . We rea l i ze 
tha t as a court made up of men, there i s a 
p o s s i b i l i t y of masculine b i a s , which we should 
endeavor to guard against in considering mat-
t e r s of t h i s charac te r . But we do not regard 
14 
i t as our jud ic i a l function to pass upon the 
soundness or the unsoundness of the ideas jus t 
mentioned above.A/ 
(Emphasis added) 
517 P.2d at 1012-13. 
However, times have d r a s t i c a l l y changed since WW II a 
the law must recognize the r e a l i t i e s and sociological advances 
made by women in soc ie ty . 
As American society experiences the "future shock" 
of social revolution in t r ad i t i ona l sex r o l e s , common law 
—' An even more incredible case is Salt Lake City v« Wilson, 
Utah 60, 148 P. 1104 (Utah 1915), which s t a t ed : 
I t i s not l i ke ly that females will ever compete 
with the males for the office of county road 
commissioner; or for any office r e l a t ing to the 
public roads. . . . I t i s a matter of general 
knowledge that man, during his ac t ive ca ree r , 
is the breadwinner for the family, and that 
upon him must fa l l the d i r e c t burden of 
discharging the public d u t i e s , and especia l ly 
so when physical exertion and strength are 
required . . . . Of course, such consequences 
would not control the pr inc ip le he contends 
for if i t were true that under the cons t i tu -
t ional provision which he invokes women may 
not be put in a c lass by themselves. Such a 
c l a s s i f i c a t i on has, however, always been made 
and enforced from time immemorial, and, unless 
prohibited in express terms in the Constitu-
t i on , i t i s a natural and proper one to make. 
(Emphasis added) 
Id . at 1107. 
These old cases i l l u s t r a t e how the cour t s ' a t t i t udes 
about sex roles have evolved over the past 50 years . 
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d o c t r i n e s must be reexamined in l i g h t of fundamental changes in 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law.—/ 
One e a r t h shaking change was announced by the United 
S t a t e s Supreme Court in Reed v . Reed, 404 US 7 1 , 30 L.Ed 2d 225 
(1973) , where the Court held t h a t : 
To g ive a mandatory p re fe rence to members of 
e i t h e r sex over members of the o t h e r , merely 
to accomplish the e l i m i n a t i o n of hea r ings on 
the m e r i t s , i s to make the very kind of 
a r b i t r a r y l e g i s l a t i v e choice forbidden by the 
Equal P r o t e c t i o n Clause of the Four teenth 
Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the 
p o s i t i v e va lue s of avoiding i n t r a f a m i l y 
c o n t r o v e r s y , the choice in t h i s c o n t e x t may 
not l awfu l ly be mandated s o l e l y on the b a s i s 
of s e x . 
By provid ing d i s s i m i l a r t r ea tment for men and 
women who are thus s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d , the 
chal lenged s ec t i on v i o l a t e s the Equal 
P r o t e c t i o n Clause . 
(Emphasis added) 
404 US a t 76-77. 
Of more s i g n i f i c a n c e , however, i s the United S t a t e s Supreme Court 
d e c i s i o n of Stanton v . S t an ton , 421 US 7, 43 L.Ed 688 (1975) 
where the Supreme Court in s t r i k i n g down a Utah c h i l d support 
—' S u r p r i s i n g l y in Stanton v . Stanton the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized t h i s f a c t and s a i d : 
We a re aware t h a t both s o c i e t y in gene ra l 
and i n t e r f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p s have been under-
going change, as they undoubtedly shou ld . . . 
and we wholly agree t h a t an e s s e n t i a l a spec t 
of the v i t a l i t y of the law i s t h a t i t should 
change to meet changing c o n d i t i o n s . 
(Emphasis added) 
517 P.2d a t 1012. 
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s t a tu t e c r i t i c i z e d the Utah c o u r t ' s reasoning and what i t cal led 
"old notions" about sex ro l e s : 
The [Utah] court referred to what is cal led 
some "old notions" , namely, " that general ly i t 
is the man's primary r e spons ib i l i t y to provide a 
home and i t s e s s e n t i a l s / 1 i b i d . ; that " i t i s a 
sa lutary thing for him to get a good education 
and/or t ra ining before he undertakes those 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s / ' . . . tha t "g i r l s " tend 
general ly to mature physical ly , emotionally 
and mentally before boys"; and that "they 
generally tend to marry e a r l i e r , " ibid. I t 
concluded: 
" [ I ] t is our judgment that there i s 
no bas is upon which we would be j u s t i f i ed 
in concluding that the s t a tu te is so 
beyond a reasonable doubt in conf l i c t 
with cons t i tu t iona l provisions that i t 
should be str icken down as inva l id ." 
If such a change were des i r ab le , the court 
sa id , " that is a matter which should commend 
i t s e l f to the a t t en t ion of the l e g i s l a t u r e . " 
I t may be t r u e , as the Utah court observed 
and as i s argued here, that i t i s the man's 
primary r e spons ib i l i t y to provide a home and 
that i t i s sa lu tary for him to have education 
and t ra ining before he assumes that 
r e spons ib i l i t y ; tha t g i r l s tend to mature 
e a r l i e r than boys; and that females tend to 
marry e a r l i e r than males. 
Notwithstanding the "old notions" to which 
the Utah court r e fe r red , we perceive nothing 
ra t iona l in the d i s t i nc t i on drawn by [the 
s ta tu te] which, when re la ted to the divorce 
decree, r e s u l t s in the appe l lee ' s l i a b i l i t y 
for support for Sherri only to age 18 but for 
Rick to age 21. This imposes " c r i t e r i a wholly 
unrelated to the object ive of that s t a t u t e . " 
A ch i ld , male or female, i s s t i l l a ch i ld . No 
longer is the female destined solely for the 
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home and the rearing of the family, and only 
the male for the marketplace and the world of 
ideas . 
Women's a c t i v i t i e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are 
increasing and expanding. Coeducation i s a 
f ac t , not a r a r i t y . The presence of women in 
business , in the professions, in government 
and, indeed, in a l l walks of l i f e where educa-
tion is a d e s i r a b l e , if not always a 
necessary, antecedent i s apparent and a proper 
subject of jud ic i a l no t i ce . 
. . . 
And if any weight remains in this day to the 
claim of earlier maturity of the female, with 
a concomitant inference of absence of need for 
support beyond 18, we fail to perceive its 
unquestioned truth or its significance, 
We therefore conclude that under any test— 
compelling state interest, or rational basis, 
in the context of child support, [the statute] 
does not survive an equal protection attack. 
In the context, no valid distinction between 
male and female may be drawn. 
(Emphasis added) 
421 US at 14-16. 
In Stanton the U.S. Supreme Court took jud ic i a l notice of the 
changed s ta tus of women in American society and the changed re la -
t ionships between men and women and held that the "old notions" 
expressed by the Utah Court and s tereotypica l thinking and a t t i -
tudes about sexual ro les could no longer be acceptable in s ta tu -
tory or j ud i c i a l precepts . (See Stanton 421 US at 14-15). 
Since Reed and Stanton, the Supreme Court has become 
increasingly c r i t i c a l of s t a t e s ta tu to ry and jud ic i a l doctr ines 
18 
tha t draw a r b i t r a r y d i s t i n c t i o n s based on sex. In Orr v« Orr, 
440 U.S. 268, 59 L.Ed 2d 306 (1979), the Supreme Court in 
s t r ik ing down an Alabama alimony s t a tu t e providing for alimony to 
wife but not husband s t a t ed : 
The fact that the c l a s s i f i ca t ion expressly 
discr iminates against men ra ther than women 
does not protec t i t from scrut iny . 
. . . 
If the s t a tu te is to survive cons t i tu t iona l 
a t t ack , there fore , i t must be validated on 
some other b a s i s . 
One is a l e g i s l a t i v e purpose to provide help 
for needy spouses, using sex as a proxy for 
need. The other is a goal of compensating 
women for past discrimination during marriage, 
which asser ted ly has l e f t them unprepared to 
fend for themselves in the working world 
following divorce. 
But in t h i s case , even if sex were a 
r e l i a b l e proxy for need, and even if the i n s t i -
tut ion of marriage did discriminate against 
women, these factors s t i l l would "not adequately jus t i fy the sa l i en t features of" Alabama's 
s t a tu to ry scheme. 
S imi lar ly , since individualized hearings can 
determine which women were in fact d iscr imi-
nated against v i s - a -v i s the i r husbands, as well 
as which family uni ts defied the stereotype 
and le f t the husband dependent on the wife, 
Alabama's alleged compensatory purpose may be 
effectuated without placing burdens sole ly on 
husbands. 
[ c] l ass i f i ca t ions which d i s t r i b u t e bene-
f i t s and burdens on the basis of gender carry 
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the inherent r i sk of reinforcing stereotypes 
about the "proper place" of women and the i r 
need for special p ro tec t ion . 
Where, as here , the S t a t e ' s compensatory and 
ameliorat ive purposes are as well served by a 
gender-neutral c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as one that 
gender c l a s s i f i e s and therefore c a r r i e s with 
i t the baggage of sexual s te reotypes , the State 
cannot be permitted to c lass i fy on the bas is 
of sex, (Emphasis added) 
440 US at 279-283. 
The Orr case l ike the Reed and Stanton decisions forbids 
s t a t e schemes premised upon the "s te reo typica l" reasoning that 
women are somehow always e n t i t l e d to treatment d i f fe ren t from men 
and hold that due process and equal protection both "require a 
court to spec i f i ca l ly focus upon the individual circumstances of 
the pa r t i e s and make a specif ic determination upon the meri ts of 
the pa r t i cu la r case before the courts can j u s t i f y d i ss imi la r 
treatment of the pa r t i e s based on sex. 
The d i rec t ion the Court i s moving is perhaps best sum-
marized by Jus t i ce O'Connor's Opinion in Mississippi University 
for Women v. Hog an, 458 U.S. 718, 73 L.Ed 2d 1090 (1982) where 
the High Court sa id : 
Although the t e s t for determining the 
v a l i d i t y of a gender-based c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s 
s t ra ightforward, i t must be applied free of 
fixed notions concerning the ro les and a b i l i t i e s 
of males and females. Care must be taken in 
ascer ta ining whether the s t a tu to ry object ive 
i t s e l f r e f l e c t s archaic and s tereotypic not ions . 
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The purpose of requiring that close r e l a t i o n -
ship is to assure that the v a l i d i t y of a 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n is determined through reasoned 
analysis ra ther than through the mechanical 
applicat ion of t r ad i t i ona l , often inaccurate , 
assumptions about the proper ro les of men and 
women. The need for the requirement i s amply 
revealed by reference to the broad range of 
s t a t u t e s already invalidated by t h i s Court, 
s t a t u t e s tha t re l ied upon the s i m p l i s t i c , out-
dated assumption that gender could be used as 
a "proxy for o ther , more germane bases of 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n / ' to es tab l i sh a l ink between 
objective and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
The same searching analysis must be madef 
regardless of whether the S t a t e ' s object ive is 
to eliminate family controversy, to achieve 
adminis t ra t ive ef f ic iency, or to balance the 
burdens borne by males and females, (Emphasis 
added) 
458 US at 724-728. 
The appellant recognizes that the above cited cases are 
challenges to the facial invalidity of state statutes, and does 
not contend that the Utah Alimony Statute is unconstitutional as 
written; however, the appellant does contend that the Utah 
Alimony Statute has been and >is being unconstitutionally applied 
in that the courts almost never award alimony to men and almost 
always award alimony to women regardless of actual need. 
In the case at bar, the trial court did not focus upon 
the individual merits of the Sampinos case and ascertain a 
greater need on the part of Donna and a lesser need on the part 
of John. Instead, it fell victim to the "archaic notions of 
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sexual stereotypes" described by Jus t i ce O'Connor and simply 
awarded Donna a l i fe t ime annuity at John's expense. In shor t , 
the t r i a l c o u r t ' s e r ror was a subt le one. I t simply reasoned 
that since John received a comfortable income from the inher i -
tance from his parents i t would be nice if his ex-wife Donna 
were to receive 30% of John's share of h is parents ' labors . 
A close examination of the record does not disclose any 
grea te r need on the par t of Donna than i t does on the par t of 
John nor does i t show any grea ter income earning a b i l i t y . Instead, 
the court focused purely on John's a b i l i t y to pay. That i s the 
"s te reo typ ica l baggage" described by Jus t i ce O'Connor in 
Mississippi University for Women, supra. The t r i a l court should 
have performed the personal indepth analysis on the Sampinos 
s i t ua t i on and not simply allowed John 's a b i l i t y to pay override 
cons t i t u t iona l cons idera t ions . If a b i l i t y to pay i s the paramount 
c r i t e r i o n regardless of equal i ty of need or a b i l i t y to support 
one ' s se l f , then the ghost of Tommy Manville shal l l i ve forever 
in the law. And any woman who marries a man of even modest means 
wil l be en t i t l ed to a l i fe t ime annuity regardless of the qual i ty 
and quant i ty of her contr ibut ion to the marriage con t r ac t . 
2. The Utah Supreme Court must e s t ab l i sh some def in i te 
guidel ines for the D i s t r i c t Courts to follow; 
The appel lant recognizes that in domestic r e l a t i ons 
mat ters the t r i a l court must have the broadest possible d i sc re -
tion and f l e x i b i l i t y in order to fashion workable and equitable 
awards. However, i t i s encumbant upon the Utah high court to set 
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down some guidel ines so that the outcome of a domestic t r i a l does 
not depend t o t a l l y upon the philosophical d ispos i t ion of the par-
t i cu l a r t r i a l judge. In other words unless the Utah Supreme 
Court expresses some gu ide l ines , firm rules or boundaries, the 
outcome of any given domestic proceeding will continue to depend 
upon which t r i a l judge the pa r t i e s happen to draw. That c i r -
cumstance is a n t i t h e t i c a l to notions of s imilar treatment for 
those s imi lar ly s i t u a t e d . Reed v. Reed , supra. 
Focusing now on the case at bar : The c o u r t ' s award of 
alimony to Donna Sampinos i s an example of what the U.S. Supreme 
Court described as the s i m p l i s t i c , outdated and mechanically 
applied "old notions" about the proper ro les of men and women in 
soc ie ty . (see Stanton, 421 US at 10 & 14 and Orr v . Orr, 440 US 
a t 283-284.) If the circumstances in t h i s case were reversed and 
Donna Sampinos had received a subs tant ia l inheri tance from her 
family instead of John, i t i s highly unl ikely tha t the court 
would have awarded John Sampinos a $25,000 cash award, $800.00 
per month alimony or 30% of Donna's en t i r e pretax inher i tance. 
In fact in t h i s case the t r i a l court t o t a l l y ignored Donna's 
inher i t ance . 
The Utah Supreme Court could p rac t i ca l ly take jud ic ia l 
notice that men are almost never awarded alimony from their ex-
wives regardless of the i r r e l a t i v e economic circumstances. The 
reason one might offer is that t r a d i t i o n a l l y men do not stay 
23 
homef r a i se children and keep house while the wife works. 
However, in the Sampinos case there were no chi ldren except 
Donna's by a previous marriage which John Sampinos supported 
un t i l he was 18. Donna gave up nothing in order that John could 
educate himselff pursue a career or accumulate an e s t a t e and 
Donna contributed nothing to the mari ta l e s t a t e . When Donna and 
John were married she was over 40, owned her own homef had her 
own j ob, had children from a previous marriage and was a f ree , 
independent self-support ing female. John was s imi la r ly circum-
stanced. He was over 40, worked as a carpenter and farm hand, 
supported his children by previous marriage and was in a l l 
respects a f ree , independent self-support ing male. 
Although John and Donna were married a t o t a l of 11 
yea r s , the marriage was always rocky and tempestuous and the par-
t i e s ac tua l ly only lived together as husband and wife for about 
six of those years . (Tr. 29-35, 54-58; Defendant's Exhibit 13) 
During one of the i r many separa t ions , Donna sold her 
home and spent most of the $47,000 received on herse l f . (R. 51a) 
The pa r t i e s never did build any so r t of mar i ta l e s ta te during the 
e n t i r e time they were married to each o ther . If John's inher i -
tance i s not considered, then the pa r t i e s l e f t each other in much 
the same circumstances they found each o ther . In shor t , John and 
Donna Sampinos marriage do not f i t the "old notions" or stereotypes 
of marriage where the wife sacr i f iced herself by ra i s ing children 
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and keeping the home while John educated himselff pursued his 
career and builds a marital estate. 
Since both John and Donna are equally able to work and 
support themselves, one must ask why does John owe Donna a living 
now that they are divorced. Why is Donna entitled to a lifetime 
annuity from John unless it is based upon the "old notions" and 
stereotypic thinking described in Stanton , Orr and Mississippi 
University for Women. In Reed v, Reed, supra, Stanton v. 
Stanton, supra , and Orr , supra, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
"mandatory preferences to members of either sex over members of 
the other merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the 
merits is to make the very kind of arbitrary choice forbidden by 
the equal protection clause. . . . " (Reed v. Reed, 404 US at 76). 
On this appeal, John Sampinos does not suggest the Court 
abolish alimony, but the appellant does request the Court to re-
examine the circumstances under which the trial court should 
award alimony, especially when the parties have had no children, 
have made no sacrifices, given up nothing to the marriage and 
were similarly situated in all respects both before and after the 
marriage. 
In the recent case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072 
(Utah 1985), Justice Zimmerman articulated and affirmed the 
alimony test previously announced in English v. English, 565 P. 2d 
at 409, 411 (Utah 1977) which holds that in granting alimony, the 
Court should examine: 
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1. The f inancial condit ions and needs 
of the wife. 
2. The a b i l i t y of the wife to produce 
suf f ic ien t income for herself ; and, 
3. The a b i l i t y of the husband to 
provide support. 
(Emphasis added) 
Id . at 411-12. 
The English t e s t , of course, i s s tated in terms of the "wife" 
receiving and the husband paying; no doubt if the circumstances 
were reversed the court would use the same standard in examining 
whether to award the husband alimony. However, tha t i s not 
r e a l l y the poin t . The precise questions that the appel lant seeks 
answered on appeal a re : 
1. Where no children are involved and both pa r t i e s are 
equally capable of working and supporting themselves 
should there be a knee jerk presumption that the female 
i s e n t i t l e d to alimony from the male as a matter of 
course . 
2. Where the husband and wife are otherwise s imi lar ly eco-
nomically circumstanced, should the t r i a l court consider 
the husband's "sole and separate" property for purposes 
of an alimony award. 
3. F ina l ly , in applying the three point English t e s t : 
1. If the f inancial condition and need of the 
wife i s no grea ter or l esse r than that of 
the husband; and, 
2. If the a b i l i t y of the wife to produce a 
su f f i c ien t income for herself i s not 
s i gn i f i can t ly grea ter or l esser than that 
of her husband; 
3. Should the husband's a b i l i t y to pay her 
alimony from funds derived from the sale 
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of h i s " s o l e and s e p a r a t e " p r o p e r t y o u t -
weigh o r s u p e r s e d e t h e e q u a l i t y of t h e 
o t h e r two f a c t o r s . 
In s h o r t , when i t comes t o a l i m o n y , a r e women s t i l l e n t i t l e d to 
d i f f e r e n t t r e a t m e n t from men s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e y a r e f e m a l e . The 
r e c o r d in t h i s c a s e shows t h a t o t h e r t han J o h n ' s i n h e r i t a n c e t h e y 
a r e s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d . That b e i n g the c a s e , d o e s John owe Donna 
30% of h i s s h a r e of h i s m o t h e r ' s and f a t h e r ' s work ove r the p a s t 
50 y e a r s ; a n d , i f t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t he d o e s owe Donna an 
a n n u i t y , shou ld c o u r t s in t h e f u t u r e award e x - h u s b a n d s a n n u i t i e s 
from t h e i r e x - w i v e s i n h e r i t a n c e even though t h e y a r e e d u c a t e d , 
a b l e bod ied and e m p l o y a b l e . 
The a p p e l l a n t r e s p e c t f u l l y s u g g e s t s t h e t i m e has come t o 
r e examine t h e h e r e t o f o r e m e c h a n i c a l l y a p p l i e d s t a n d a r d s fo r 
award ing a l imony t o women and beg in t o t r e a t men and women t r u l y 
e q u a l l y in the c o u r t s of l a w . 
POINT I I I 
THE ALIMONY AWARD UPSET THE FAIRNESS AND EQUITY OF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTIES' PROPERTY 
In E n g l i s h v . E n g l i s h , 565 P .2d 409 , 411 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) , 
t h i s Cour t s e t f o r t h t h r e e f a c t o r s t o be c o n s i d e r e d in d e t e r -
min ing a r e a s o n a b l e a l i m o n y award . Those f a c t o r s a r e : (1) the 
f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n s and needs of t h e w i f e ; (2) t he w i f e ' s a b i -
l i t y t o p roduce a s u f f i c i e n t income for h e r s e l f ; and (3) The 
a b i l i t y of t h e husband to p r o v i d e s u p p o r t . See a l s o , Olson v . 
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Olson, 704 P. 2d 564 (Utah 1985); Jones v . J o n e s , 700 P. 2d 1072 
(Utah 1985); Higley v . Higley , 676 P. 2d 379 (Utah 1983) . 
Apparent ly based on these f a c t o r s , the t r i a l c o u r t in the presen t 
case awarded $800 a month in permanent alimony to Donna Sampinos. 
That alimony award c o n f l i c t e d with the p r i n c i p l e s on which the 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n of the p a r t i e s ' p rope r ty was based 
and, t h u s , upse t the b a s i c f a i r n e s s and equ i ty of t h a t d i s t r i b u -
t i o n . 
As found by the t r i a l cou r t in accordance with the 
undisputed ev idence , " [ t] he only income c u r r e n t l y being received 
by the defendant i s from the s a l e of the farm p r o p e r t y , the l e a s e 
of the Savoy Club and the income from working the farm." (R. 52) 
J o h n ' s annual income from the Savoy Club is $3,000 and the income 
from working the farm is only $2,000 annua l ly . (TR. 42, 43) 
Thus, the u l t ima te source of the alimony payments to Donna i s the 
proceeds of the s a l e of the Sampinos family farm. Although 
awarded under the r u b r i c of "al imony," the $800 monthly payments 
t o Donna are tantamount to 30% of J o h n ' s one f i f t h share of the 
proceeds of the Sampinos family farm. 
Under the p r i n c i p l e s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h i s Court for the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y , however, Donna Sampinos was not 
e n t i t l e d to share in the proceeds of the Sampinos family farm. 
This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t , upon a d ivo rce of p a r t i e s 
to a mar r i age of r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t d u r a t i o n , p r o p e r t y which was 
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acquired by a spouse before the marriage or by g i f t or inher i -
tance during the marriage should be awarded to that spouse as 
sole and separate property. Preston v» Preston, 646 P.2d 705 
(Utah 1982); Georgedas v. Georgedas, 627 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1981); 
Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328-29 (Utah 1980); 
Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d 193, 195-96 (Utah 1974). The 
general rule der ives from the pr inc ip le that each party to a 
divorce is en t i t l ed to an equi table share of asse t s accumulated 
during the marriage by the p a r t i e s ' jo in t e f fo r t s in the 
marriage. Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah 1983); 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). Conversely, 
as asse t s not a t t r i b u t a b l e to the p a r t i e s ' jo in t e f for t s in the 
marriage, previously owned property, g i f t s and inheri tances 
should, in fairness and equi ty, be restored to the previous 
owner, donee or devisee. 
For example, in Preston v. Preston, supra, t h i s Court 
held that the t r i a l court erred in dividing the property of par-
t i e s to a seven year marriage by fa i l ing to c red i t the husband 
for his con t r ibu t ion , from property he owned before the marriage, 
to the p a r t i e s ' recreat ional cabin. Further, the Court affirmed 
the t r i a l c o u r t ' s award to the wife of property she had acquired 
during the marriage by inher i tance . Explaining i t s decision the 
Court s t a t ed : 
The wife 's inheri tance was not acquired 
through the " jo in t e f for t s of the p a r t i e s , " 
anymore than the husband's separate contribu-
t ion to the cost of the cabin. By denying the 
29 
wife a share of the husband's separate pro-
perty contributed to the cabin and by denying 
the husband a share of the wife 's i nhe r i t ance , 
we t r e a t the separate property of both p a r t i e s 
on the same b a s i s , 
646 P.2d at 706 (quoting Jesperson v. Jesperson, supra ) . 
S imi lar ly , in Georg edas v . Georgedas, supra , t h i s Court 
affirmed the t r i a l c o u r t ' s award to the husband of a home and 
business that he had brought into the seven year marriage. The 
Court s t a t e d : 
[T]he c o u r t ' s decree simply puts the pa r t i e s 
to a second marriage of r e l a t i v e l y shor t rea l 
duration back into sole ownership of the pro-
p e r t i e s they brought into the marriage. This 
i s not a case where the court would be required 
to conclude from the evidence that [the 
wife 's] "effor ts . . . in the monetary success 
of the marriage" made such a contr ibut ion to 
the increased value of mari ta l property tha t 
she would be en t i t l ed to share in that value 
in the property se t t lement . 
627 P.2d at 45 (quoting English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 
(Utah 1977)) . 
In the present case , the t r i a l court found in accordance 
with the great preponderance of the evidence that the "pa r t i e s ' 
marriage was of r e l a t i v e l y short duration punctuated by separa-
t ions to t a l ing more than four years ." (R. 43) The court further 
found that "the coal contracts from the [sale of the Sampinos 
family farm] and the proceeds therefrom are not asse t s acquired 
during the course of the marriage through the j o i n t e f for t s of 
the pa r t i e s but were received as a g i f t or inheri tance from 
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[John's] parents ." (R. 53) Based on these f indings, the t r i a l 
court properly awarded the proceeds of the farm sale to John 
Sampinos as his sole and separate property. 
Having properly denied Donna a share of the farm sale 
proceeds based on the pr inc ip le of " jo in t e f f o r t s , " the t r i a l 
court undermined that p r inc ip le and upset the fairness and equity 
of the property d i s t r i bu t i on by awarding her a $25,000 property 
set t lement and a share of those proceeds as "alimony." Not being 
a t t r i b u t a b l e to her e f for t s in the marriage, the $25,000 property 
set t lement together with the $800 monthly payments cons t i tu te a 
windfall to Donna. The windfall effect of the payments i s par-
t i c u l a r l y pronounced where, as here , the pa r t i e s married l a te in 
l i f e , a f te r previous marriages, where no children were born to 
the pa r t i e s and where the marriage was short and punctuated by 
separat ions to ta l ing almost half of the length of the marriage. 
The inequity of the award of John's inheri tance to Donna 
under the guise of "alimony" is further underscored by the fact 
tha t Donna received her own inheri tance of about $10,000 plus 
$47,000 in net proceeds from the sale of her home, free of any 
claim by John, and had completely disposed of them primarily for 
her own benefit a t the time of t r i a l . Having fully benefited 
from her own inheri tance and separate property, Donna should not 
further reap the benefi ts of the inheri tance and separate pro-
perty of her former husband. 
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F i n a l l y , the p rope r ty s e t t l e m e n t i t s e l f included a 
$25,000 award to Donna " to compensate her for her share of the 
Cres tview house , the Savoy a s s e t s and any c o n t r i b u t i o n she made 
on any of the o the r a s s e t s or to the mar r iage of the p a r t i e s . " 
(Emphasis added.) (R. 44) Thus, even if c o n t r a r y to a l l the 
ev idence and the c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s , some po r t ion of the farm s a l e 
proceeds could be deemed a t t r i b u t a b l e to the m a r r i a g e , Donna was 
f u l l y compensated for any such p o r t i o n in the p rope r ty s e t t l e m e n t 
i t s e l f . 
Thus, the t r i a l c o u r t should not have cons idered J o h n ' s 
income from the farm s a l e in awarding alimony to Donna. The a l i -
mony award, having been based almost s o l e l y on t h a t income, 
should be r e v e r s e d . 
POINT IV 
IN LIGHT OF THE LENGTH AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THE MARRIAGE, AND DONNA SAMPINOS' 
ASSETS AND EARNING ABILITY, THE $800 A 
MONTH PERMANENT ALIMONY AWARD TO DONNA 
WAS A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
As often stated by this Court, the purpose of alimony is 
"to maintain the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage, and to prevent the wife 
from becoming a public charge." Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 
1075 (Utah 1985) (quoting English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 
(Utah 1977). See also, Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 
1984); Georgedas v. Georgedas, 627 P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1981). In 
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accordance with that purpose, t h i s Court has establ ished a three-
par t analysis to determine a reasonable alimony award. To be 
considered are (1) the f inancial conditions and needs of the 
wife; (2) the wife 's a b i l i t y to produce a suf f ic ien t income for 
hersel f ; and (3) the husband's a b i l i t y to provide support* Olson 
v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985); Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 
(Utah 1977) . 
In the present case , the above th ree-par t analysis 
reveals that Donna Sampinos' financial assets and earning a b i l i t y 
were suf f ic ien t to maintain her at the standard of l iving she 
enjoyed during most of the p a r t i e s ' marriage and, thus , tha t the 
$800 a month permanent alimony award to her was a c lear and pre-
jud ic ia l abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . 
As to the f i r s t fac tor , the financial conditions and 
needs of the wife, the evidence adduced at t r i a l showed that the 
p a r t i e s ' standard of l iving for the en t i r e marriage except for a 
short period of reconc i l i a t ion was modest. Indeed, the t r i a l 
court spec i f i ca l ly noted in i t s memorandum decision that "neither 
of the pa r t i e s enjoyed any pa r t i cu la r wealth," (R. 43) and that 
only during the i r f i n a l , br ief period of reconci l ia t ion "did the 
p a r t i e s enjoy any kind of a lavish l i f e s t y l e . " (R. 44) Although 
Donna claimed at t r i a l that her l iving expenses were $1,695 per 
month, such expenses far exceed the standard of l iving she 
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enjoyed e i ther before or during the vast majority of the 
marriage. 
Donna's asse t s under the property d i s t r i b u t i o n provi-
sions of the divorce decree include $5,000 in cash (paid within 
s ix ty days of the date of the dec ree ) , a $20,000 mortgage payable 
in semi-annual instal lments over twenty years , any remainder of 
her o r ig ina l inheri tance of over $10,000, and a l l of the par t ies 1 
household furni ture and appl iances. 
As to the second factor in the th ree -par t ana lys i s , the 
wife ' s a b i l i t y to produce a suf f ic ien t income for hersel f , ev i -
dence of Donna's employment h i s to ry presented at t r i a l showed 
that Donna i s sk i l l ed in bookkeeping and has the a b i l i t y to earn , 
in 1975 d o l l a r s , $1,000 a month. 
Thus, the evidence shows that Donna has subs tan t ia l 
f inancial asse ts and earning a b i l i t y , and that these resources 
are suf f ic ien t to maintain her at the standard of l iving enjoyed 
by the pa r t i e s throughout most of the i r marriage. Regardless of 
the third factor in the th ree-par t ana lys i s , the husband's abi -
l i t y to provide support , no need for alimony was demonstrated and 
none should have been awarded. 
In addit ion to the primarily economic factors included 
in the above th ree -par t a n a l y s i s , however, numerous equi table 
fac tors are re levant here . In McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 
573, 236 P. 2d 1066 (1951), t h i s Court enumerated fif teen factors 
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of varying importance from case to case to be considered in eva-
luating and adjusting the r igh t s and obl igat ions of pa r t i e s upon 
divorce . Among those not included in the th ree-par t analysis but 
re levant here a r e : (1) the social posit ion and standard of 
l iv ing of each party before the marriage, (2) the respect ive ages 
of the pa r t i e s at the time of the marriage, (3) the r e l a t i ve abi-
l i t y , t ra in ing and education of the p a r t i e s , (4) the duration of 
the marriage, (5) children reared, and (6) the present mental and 
physical health of the p a r t i e s . Id. 
Whether or to what extent an alimony award is appropriate 
in a given case may res t on the consideration of the above fac-
to r s in addit ion to the economic considerat ions included in the 
th ree -pa r t ana lys i s . For example, where the f inancial resources 
of one spouse are subs tan t i a l ly greater than those of the o ther , 
fac tors such as the length of the marriage, the age of the par-
t i e s , or the p a r t i e s ' standard of l iving before the marriage, 
may, in equi ty , d i c t a t e that permanent alimony be awarded ( e . g . 
Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983)), that temporary or 
r e h a b i l i t a t i v e alimony be granted ( e . g . Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 
P.2d 69 (Utah 1984); Warren v. Warren, 655 P.2d 684 (Utah 1982)), 
or that no alimony be awarded at a l l . ( e . g . Graff v. Graff, 699 
P.2d 765 (Utah 1985)) . 
For example, in Graff v. Graff, supra, t h i s Court 
affirmed the denial of even a temporary alimony award to the 
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wife, although the husband's income was over $2f200 a month 
grea te r than hers . The marriage in that case was c h i l d l e s s , was 
the husband's second marriage, and lasted only nine years . The 
wife enjoyed a higher standard of l iving during the marriage than 
she had enjoyed before the marriage, and requested a temporary 
alimony award to enable her to obtain an advanced degree and thus 
achieve an earning a b i l i t y that would allow her to l ive according 
to the standard of l iv ing of the pa r t i e s during the marriage. 
The Court upheld the t r i a l c o u r t ' s determination that "there was 
no basis for an alimony award under the circumstances." Id. 
All of the above factors as applied to the present case 
m i l i t a t e against the award of alimony. This was a ch i ld le s s 
marriage entered by both the pa r t i e s l a t e in l i f e and after pre-
vious marr iages. The marriage was short and punctuated by 
numerous separat ions amounting to approximately half of the to t a l 
durat ion of the marriage. Employed during the marriage, self-
supporting prior to and during a subs tan t ia l portion of the 
marriage, and healthy and able to work at the time of the 
d ivorce , Donna may reasonably, and should, be expected to support 
herse l f a f te r the p a r t i e s ' divorce. Under the circumstances, the 
$800 a month permanent alimony award provides a d is incent ive 
against Donna's use of her subs tan t ia l earning capacity to sup-
port hersel f and as such cons t i t u t e s a c lear and pre judic ia l 
abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . 
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F i n a l l y , assuming a rguendo t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n t h a t some a l imony i s a p p r o p r i a t e was w i t h i n the c o u r t ' s 
d i s c r e t i o n , n e v e r t h e l e s s , based on t h e l e n g t h and c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
of t h e m a r r i a g e , t h e award shou ld have been l i m i t e d to a r e a s o n -
a b l e , t e m p o r a r y p e r i o d , and t h i s Cour t shou ld modify t h e d e c r e e 
a c c o r d i n g l y . Should f u t u r e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w a r r a n t t h e con-
t i n u a t i o n of a l i m o n y beyond a t e m p o r a r y p e r i o d , p l a i n t i f f may 
p e t i t i o n t he t r i a l c o u r t fo r a m o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e d e c r e e under 
t h e c o u r t ' s c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o U.C.A. , 1953, 
§ 3 0 - 3 - 5 . 
CONCLUSION 
The award of a l imony t o Donna Sampinos was i n c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h t h e award of J o h n ' s i n h e r i t a n c e t o him as s o l e and s e p a r a t e 
p r o p e r t y and wi th t h e p r i n c i p l e of " j o i n t e f f o r t s " on which t h e 
p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n was b a s e d . 
F u r t h e r , t h e a l imony award was based on t h e i m p l i c i t 
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t b e c a u s e Donna was female and John was a b l e t o pay 
she was e n t i t l e d to a l i m o n y . Such an a s s u m p t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a 
sex based c l a s s i f i c a t i o n in v i o l a t i o n of due p r o c e s s and equa l 
p r o t e c t i o n . 
F i n a l l y , t h e r e was no d e m o n s t r a t e d need fo r a l imony h e r e 
b e c a u s e Donna was f u l l y c a p a b l e of s e l f s u p p o r t . 
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Pla in t i f f , the re fore , seeks t h i s Court to reverse the 
alimony award, o r , in the a l t e r n a t i v e , to modify the decree to 
reduce the alimony award in both amount and dura t ion . 
DATED t h i s 3 f — day of October, 1985 
WATKISS ^£AHPEELL 
f ) y / / 
. .•/ y "' 
ROBERT D. MAACK 
DEBRA JXKOORE 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendant and 
A p p e l l a n t 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was served by mail, postage pre-
paid thereon, upon the following: 
Richard K. Crandall 
350 South 400 East #114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED this 31st day of October, 1985 
AuJi* & al(to9 
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DECISION 
Sivr. ri-L.'STr.'CTCCLMT 
C ....:•. r:cL'\7Y. LTAH 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON,^ CQ,UN3^ 
STATE OF UTAH ..,....,,,, ...r„ . _., 
— — — — — • — — — — u', i" u \ \ 
DONNA R. SAMPINOS, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
JOHN S. SAMPINOS, 
DEFENDANT. ) CIVIL NO. 13,922 
The above-entitled action came on for hearing on May 14, 
1984, the Court having heard the testimony, having received the 
exhibits and taken the matter under advisement makes the follow-
ing ruling. 
It should be noted that this marriage was one of relatively 
short duration punctuated by four separations of varying 
duration. Of a total marriage of eleven years, the parties were 
separated for more than four years. During the majority of the 
marriage, neither of the parties enjoyed any particular wealth 
the defendant being continually employed either at the Savoy Club 
in Price, working at Jelco or working on the ranch property of 
the family. From time to time the plaintiff also found it 
necessary to be employed. In 1977 f the plaintiff received an 
inheritance consisting of money and mineral interests and in 
1980, the defendant's earlier received gift or inheritance from 
his parents suddenly generated a great deal of income when the 
mineral rights were sold. Only after that timef did these 
parties enjoy any kind of a lavish lifestyle and that continuing 
until their separation in 1983. 
The issues involved in this case other than the question of 
the divorce all concern the distribution of assets and most of 
those assets being traceable to one party or the other. 
Based upon the above facts the Court rules as follows. 
1. Plaintiff shall be awarded a decree of divorce 
from defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty, such decree to 
become final thirty-one (31) days from entry. 
2. Plaintiff shall be awarded alimony in the sum of 
Eight Hundred Dollars (?800.00) per month, such figure being 
determined by taking into account her needs, defendant's ability 
to pay from his earnings, and the Social Security Benefit lost by 
plaintiff upon her marriage to defendant. 
3. Plaintiff shall be awarded a property settlement 
to compensate her for her share of the Crestview house, the Savoy 
assets, and any contribution she made on any of the other assets 
and to the marriage of the parties in the sum of Twenty-five 
Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00). Plaintiff shall receive the sum 
of Five Thousand Dollars (55,000.00) in cash within sixty (60) 
days from the date ot this decree, the balance shall be secured 
by a mortgage on the Crestview house and payable in semi-annual 
installments for a period of twenty (20) years, the principal 
bearing interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum. 
® 
-2-
4. Plaintiff shall receive the furniture, appliances 
and household equipment located in the Crestview house. 
5. Plaintiff shall receive any remainder of her 
inheritance. 
6. Defendant shall receive the lot in Price, Utah, 
the Crestview home and the adjoining lot, the coal contract 
receivable, the Savoy Club assets and licenses and the farm 
equipment. Each of the assets awarded to defendant either was 
owned by him prior to the marriage or was acquired by income 
generated by such assets. The coal contract was received by him 
as a gift or inheritance and consequently belongs to him. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded the sum of Two Thousand 
Dollars ($2,000.00) in attorney tees together with her costs in-
curred in bringing this action. 
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to prepare Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree in conformance with this ruling and to 
submit them to opposing counsel and to the Court. 
DATED this 2$? day of June, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
-3-
cc: Richard K. Crandall 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Robert D. Maack 
310 South Main Street 
Twelfth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
© 
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ROBERT D. MAACK 
BRUCE R. BAIRD 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 South Main Street, Suite 12O0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
SEVENTH DISTRICT CCURT 
CAr.50N CCvilTY.UTAH 
FILED 
NOV 16 W\ 
NORMAH POCHARD. CLERK 
' DEPUTY J 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONNA R. SAMPINOS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOHN B. SAMPINOS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 13922 
On May 14, 1984, at the hour of 2:00 o'clock P.M., the 
above-entitled action came on for trial, the Honorable Richard C. 
Davidson, District Judge, presiding. The plaintiff appeared 
personally together with counsel Richard K. Crandall of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau; the defendant appeared personally and 
together with his counsel, Robert D. Maack and Bruce R. Baird of 
Watkiss & Campbell. The Court heard testimony, received exhibits 
and considered evidence offered by the parties in support of 
their respective causes. Having received the partial Stipulation 
of Facts and having heard arguments of counsel the parties sub-
mitted the case to the court for adjudication. The court having 
taken the matter under advisement and having rendered its deci-
sion in a memorandum dated June 28, 1984, now therefore makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, havin 
been married in Evanston, Wyoming, on September 1, 1972. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are residents of Carbon 
County, State of Utah and have been for more than three months 
immediately prior to the filing of the Complaint. 
3. This was a second marriage for both parties; plain-
tiff was 41 years old and defendant was 44 years old when they 
were married to each other. 
4. The parties' marriage was of relatively short dura-
tion punctuated by four separations totalling more than four 
years. 
5. There are no children born as issue of this 
marriage; however, both parties had children from prior 
marriages. 
6. During the course of the marriage, the Defendant 
treated the plaintiff cruelly, causing her great emotional and 
mental distress. 
7. During the course of the marriage, the defendant, 
John Sampinos, was continuously employed either at the Savoy Clu 
in Price, as a carpenter for Jelco, Inc. or working on the farm 
property owned by his family. 
8. During the course of the marriage, the plaintiff, 
Donna Sampinos, from time to time, also found it necessary to be 
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employed. Plaintiff Ao trained as a bookkeeper. In 1973, plain-
tiff worked approximately six months earning $700/month; in 
1974-75, plaintiff was employed approximately nine months at a 
salary of $1,000/month; and in 1976-77, plaintiff was employed 
approximately nine months earning a salary of $850/month. This 
income was used for family purposes. 
9. During the course of the marriage the parties did 
not enjoy a particularly lavish lifestyle. The defendant was 
I primarily employed during the course of the marriage in the 
J construction industry, as a farmer, and an operator of the Savoy 
|Club in Price, Utah. From time to time the plaintiff found it 
necessary to be employed. 
10. Prior to the marriage defendant owned a vacant 
J building lot in Price. 
11. Prior to and during the marriage defendant used 
jvarious pieces of farm equipment to farm the ranch property; this 
I equipment was either owned by defendant prior to the marriage or 
[purchased wholly from the farming and Savoy Club proceeds * 
12. Prior to the inception of this marriage, defendant 
operated a business known as the Savoy Club in Price, for which 
he had purchased the equipment prior to the marriage. 
13. During the course of the marriage, the defendant 
either operated the Savoy Club or leased the Savoy Club and used 
the income therefrom to support the marriage. 
14. Plaintiff was never involved in any way in the 
management or operation of the Savoy Club. 
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15. On October 10, 1973, Defendant, and each of his 
four sisters, received a gift from his parents of a "one-fifth" 
interest in certain farm property purchased in the 1930's by his 
parents. 
16. On November 1, 1974, plaintiff, defendant and his 
j four sisters entered into a declaration agreeing to use whatever 
proceeds were necessary from the farm property to support their 
| parents. 
lj 17. During the first seven years of the marriage the 
|! parties lived in a home which had been purchased by plaintiff ir 
II 1967, prior to the marriage for $8,000 cash. In the fall of 
!| 
II 1979, at a time when the parties were separated, plaintiff Donne 
I; 
i, Sampinos sold her Miller Creek home for $50,000 and used all of 
\\ the $47,000 net proceeds/tas set forth in Exhibit #8. 
|! 18. In 1977, plaintiff received an inheritance from he 
1
 father consisting of $1,500 and mineral interests which she usee 
for her sole purposes and benefit. 
j| 19. In 1980, the farm property which had been gifted 
|! to defendant John Sampinos and his four sisters was sold for the 
coal mining rights. 
20. Solely out of the proceeds of the "coal rights" 
sale and using no money from Plaintiff, defendant purchased cer-
tain property known as the "Crestview house" into which the par-
I ties moved. Out of these same "coal rights" sale proceeds 
defendant also purchased a vacant lot adjacent to the "Crestviev 
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house". Those properties are more particularly described in the 
books and records of Carbon County as: 
All of Lot 20 Crestview 
All of Lot 21 Crestview Addition 
21. After sale of the ranch property, defendant con-
tinued to work as a carpenter for Jelco until he was laid off in 
October of 1982. 
22. At the time of trial the plaintiff was not 
employed, and defendant's only employment was working on the 
family farm. 
23. The only income currently being received by defen-
dant is from the sale of the farm property, the lease of the 
Savoy Club and the income from working the farm. 
24. The only income currently being received by plain-
tiff is the alimony payments the defendant pays to plaintiff as 
ordered by the court. 
25. Both plaintiff and defendant are healthy, able-
bodied and able to work. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from 
the Defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty dissolving the 
bonds of matrimony existing between the parties. Such Decree 
should be final thirty-one (31) days after its entry. 
5 
2. The coal contract from the ranch sale, and the pro-
ceeds therefrom are not assets acquired during the course of th< 
marriage through the joint efforts of the parties but were 
received as a gift or inheritance from his parents andf there-
I fore, awarded to defendant as his sole and separate property. 
J 3. Defendant should also receive the lot in Price, Ut 
I! the Crestview home and the adjoining lot, the Savoy Club assets 
and licenses and the farm equipment as each of these assets wer 
either owned by defendant prior to the marriage or acquired 
I solely by income generated from such assets and are, therefore, 
also his sole and separate property. 
|| 4. Based Upon the needs of the plaintiff and the abi-
'• lity of the defendant to pay£those needs from his earnings, the 
|| plaintiff should be awarded the sum of $800.00 per month as ali 
j| mony. 
5. The defendant should be awarded the Crestview home 
} subject to all indebtedness thereon including the mortgage in 
I favor of the plaintiff as hereafter set forth. 
|j 6. To compensate the plaintiff for her interest in th 
|' Crestview home, the plaintiff should be awarded the sum of 
II $25,000; $5,000 of which should be paid within sixty (60) days 
from the date of the Decree. The remaining $20,000 should be 
secured by a mortgage on the Crestview home and should be paid 
semi-annual installments, the principal to bear interest at the 
I! rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum. 
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7. The Plaintiff should be awarded the household fur-
niture, fixtures and appliances presently located in the 
Crestview home, 
8. The plaintiff should be awarded the remainder of her 
inheritance as her sole and separate property. 
9. The plaintiff should be awarded the Thunderbird 
automobile presently in her possession. 
10. Each of the parties should be awarded the personal 
property and effects presently in each of his or her possessions 
at the time of the hearing. 
11. The defendant shall pay the debts of the marriage 
incurred prior to the parties' separation which have not yet been 
paid. 
12. Each of the parties should be ordered to pay those 
debts incurred by them since separation except those debts which 
the defendant is specifically ordered to pay under the Temporary 
Support Order entered in this case. 
13. Defendant should be ordered to pay to the plaintiff 
for the payment of her attorney's fees the sum of $2,000. 
Plaintiff is awarded her costs incurred herein. 
Made and entered this / day of AJfiiJeu-tzXPft 1984. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Orally AfffouQc/ i>y ^'cJwJOjnaC// ^J / ^ 
r<'L£"0 
ROBERT D. MAACK 
BRUCE R. BAIRD 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 South Main Street, Suite 12O0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-3300 
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BY. 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONNA R. SAMPINOS, 
Plaintiff, 
-v s -
JOHN B. SAMPINOS, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 13922 
On May 1 4 , 1984 f at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m. f the 
I 
I above entitled action came on for trial, the Honorable Richard C. 
I 
I Davidson, District Judge, presiding. The plaintiff appeared per-
I sonally with her counsel of record, Richard K. Crandall of Snow, 
! 
Christensen & Martineau, and the defendant appeared personally 
with his counsel of record, Robert D. Maack and Bruce R. Baird of 
Watkiss & Campbell. The Court heard the testimony and received 
evidence as offered by the parties in support of their respective 
causes. After having received and accepted the parties 1 stipula-
tion of facts, and having heard argument of counsel, the matter 
was submitted to the court for adjudication. The court having 
taken the matter under advisement and having rendered its 
Memorandum Decision on June 28, 1984, and having heretofore made 
and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the 
defendant, dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing 
between the parties; the divorce to become final and absolute 
thirty-one (31) days after the date of entry of this Decree. 
2. Based on defendant's ability to pay and on plain-
tiff's needs and loss of social security benefits, defendant is 
ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $800 per month as 
alimony. 
3. The defendant should be awarded all right, title an 
interest in the contract receivable from the sale of the farm pr 
perty as his sole and separate property in that the farm propert 
was gift or inheritance from his parents. 
4. The defendant is awarded the Crestview home and the 
adjoining lot as his sole and separate property. 
5. Defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of 
$25,000 to compensate her for her interest in the Crestview home 
Such sum is to be paid in the following manner: 
(a) $5,000 in sixty (60) days from the date of 
entry of this Decree; 
(b) Remaining $20,000 to be paid in semi-annual 
installments over the next 20 years, the principal amount to 
bear interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum. 
© 
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(c) The $20,000 obligation is to be secured by a 
mortgage against the Crestview home. 
6. Plaintiff is awarded the furniture, fixtures and 
appliances located in the Crestview home, 
7. Plaintiff is awarded the Thunderbird automobile pre-
sently in her possession. 
8. Each of the parties is awarded the personal 
possessions and effects presently in his (her) possession. 
9. Defendant is awarded the building lot owned by him 
prior to marriage as his sole and separate property. 
10. The defendant is awarded the leasehold interest in 
the Savoy Club, together with all equipment and licenses as his 
sole and separate property. 
11. The defendant is awarded the farm equipment and his 
automobiles, with the exception of the Thunderbird. 
12. The plaintiff is awarded the remainder of her 
inheritance, if any, as her sole and separate property. 
13. The defendant shall pay the debts of the marriage 
incurred prior to the parties' separation which have not yet been 
paid. 
14. Each of the parties is ordered to pay his (her) own 
debts incurred after the separation, except those debts which the 
defendant is specifically ordered to pay under the temporary sup-
port order entered in this case. 
15. The parties are ordered to cooperate in the imple-
mentation of the terms of this Decree. 
(£) 
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16. Defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of 
$2,000 for her attorney's fees. 
17. Plaintiff is awarded her costs incurred herein. 
DATED this f day of October, 1984. 
RICHARD C. DAVIDSON 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Decree of Divorce was mailed, postage pre-
paid, to Richard K. Crandall, Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 10 
Exchange Place, 11th Floor, P.O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84110, this day of October, 1984. 
on 
